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THE SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS  
AND THE WEAKENING OF THE PILLARS  







The sovereign or government debt crisis that entails solvency risk on 
the part of sovereign debtors or governments began in November 2009 in 
the wake of the global financial and economic crisis. It brought the 
institutional weaknesses of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), 
established between 1999 and 2002, to the surface. Given the dysfunctional 
operation of its institutional and regulatory systems, perspectives emerged 
that questioned the long-term viability of the EMU and anticipating the 
exit of individual member states (particularly Greece) or its complete 
break-up. 
This paper analyses the latest developments of the sovereign debt crisis 
by focusing on the relationship between the institutional system and the 
operation of the EMU on the one hand and the sovereign debt crisis on the 
other. The objective of the paper is to discuss the ways in which the 
sovereign debt crisis affected the pillars (no exits, no defaults and no bail-
outs) of the EMU. It argues that they were softened to certain degrees, but 
because they form essential parts of the monetary integration they cannot 
be dismissed completely.  
Before discussing the issue it should be underlined that the crisis has 
not primarily affected the euro’s role as a common currency. Considering 
its internal and external purchasing power (its exchange rate to major 
currencies), the euro is relatively strong in spite of eventual short-term 
depreciations against major currencies. Its roles in international 
settlements and central bank reserves were not weakened significantly. 
In terms of purchasing power parity, the euro is still overvalued vis-à-vis a 
number of major currencies. The sovereign debt crisis did not have a 
negative impact on the stability and international position of the common 
currency. The crisis impacted the member states of the EMU both directly 
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and through the regulatory mechanisms of the EMU. Thus, in this respect, 
the EMU also contributed to the sovereign debt crisis, as will be analysed 
below.  
The first section of this report discusses the three prohibitions 
stipulated in the relevant EU treaty (no exits, no defaults and no bail-outs) 
that form the three pillars of the EMU, their consequences in the 
management of the crisis, and optimum currency area theory. The 
subsequent three sections focus on the softening of the pillars of the EMU. 
The fifth section provides an overview of the latest measures. The final 
section contains the summary and conclusions. The sovereign debt crisis 
in the EMU has yet to come to an end. This report relies on data and 
information that were available before 15 July 2012. 
2. The three prohibitions and their consequences  
on managing the crisis 
The legal regulation of the Economic and Monetary Union was 
originally based on three prohibitions or negations that are strongly 
interrelated and should be interpreted together.1 Regarding the irrevocability 
of the EMU, the first prohibition is that there be no exits. The possibility 
of exit would weaken the credibility of the EMU and nurture speculation 
against weak member states. If exit were a real possibility, investors would 
purchase the high quality government securities of economically stable 
member states rather than those of weak ones predicted to leave the EMU. 
The absence of an exit clause indicates that the EMU is something more 
than a loose fixed exchange rate area or a group of countries using a 
common currency.  
According to the second prohibition, government default is not possible 
in the EMU. Government default should be avoided and there are no 
institutions, legal rules or procedures to handle the default of member 
states. 
The third prohibition contains rules on the financing of general 
government deficits and government debts. The major principle is that 
general government deficits and government debts have to be financed 
exclusively using the money and capital markets. Consequently, funding 
general government expenditures with central bank credits is prohibited, 
and EU institutions and member states are forbidden from providing the 
public sectors of troubled members with financial aid. The latter is the so-
                                                          
1 In the Hungarian economic literature, this topic was discussed by Benczes 
(2011). 
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called no bail-out clause that covers all EU member states rather than only 
those of the EMU. The set of rules included in the Treaty of Lisbon and 
reinforced by the Stability and Growth Pact and other documents are 
designed to avoid excessive general government deficits. The 
independence of the European Central Bank (ECB), which is considered 
an important value, is closely related to the no bail-out clause. The 
objective of the ECB’s monetary policy is price stability; it does not have 
any other tasks, including fiscal ones.  
Because of the no bail-out clause, EU member states facing financial 
difficulties may only turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for 
assistance. In fact, the possibility of applying for loans to the IMF may 
have been a means of escape from the no bail-out clause. Member states 
are willing to avoid this mechanism because of reputational considerations. 
Nevertheless, the empirical evidence demonstrates that the IMF had to be 
involved in the management of the sovereign debt crisis in the EMU. 
However, the IMF has agreed that it will only begin negotiations regarding 
loans to EU member states with the consent of EU institutions. Thus, this 
theoretical legal escape clause was also restricted.  
According to the founders, the three prohibitions were necessary to 
guarantee the credibility of the EMU. They also assumed that if the legal 
rules ensuring fiscal discipline were observed systematically, financial 
crises could be avoided. 
The three prohibitions have further implications. A consequence of the 
exit prohibition is that an EMU member state using the common currency 
may not mitigate short-term disequilibria and competitiveness issues by 
devaluating their national currencies. Devaluations based on the 
discretionary decision of central banks would only be possible if member 
states were to exit the EMU, but this is not permitted.  
With respect to adjustment mechanisms, the EMU is similar to the gold 
standard of the 19th century but without the use of gold. Historically, 
those countries that insisted on retaining the gold standard faced more 
substantial fiscal and political consequences during the Great Depression 
of 1929–1933 than those that eventually abandoned it. Analogously, under 
a fixed exchange rate regime in the EMU, competitiveness can be 
improved only by internal devaluation, i.e., by reducing wages (more 
precisely unit labour costs) and prices, which is a rather painful process; 
one that is more painful than external devaluation. Unlike the US, the 
EMU does not have a federal budget that makes it possible to bail out 
indebted member states facing financial tensions. 
The prohibition on government default for individual member states is 
explained by the desire to inhibit the spill-over of its negative effects to the 
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rest of the EMU. First, a government default would have a negative impact 
on banks with large proportions of the government securities of financially 
troubled member states in their portfolios. Thus, due to the strong ties 
between governments and banks, government defaults may also lead to 
bank defaults. Bank failures may have an adverse impact on financial 
stability. 
Second, the spill-over effects may be quite significant. The default of a 
sovereign debtor in the EMU (at present that of Greece is the most 
probable) may well have repercussions on other countries (such as Spain, 
Portugal and Italy) that should also be taken into account. In this context, 
the first question is whether it is possible for governments to avoid default 
by exclusively relying on their own resources or if the financial support of 
other member states and international organisations is indispensable. The 
involvement of external sources calls the validity of the no bail-out clause 
into question. The second question is, if it proves unavoidable, whether 
government default should be disorderly or managed. The latter seems to 
be preferable because it entails lower expected costs.  
The no bail-out clause is more than a limiting legal formula; it can be 
logically derived from the structure of the economic and monetary union. 
In a decentralised monetary union where no common fiscal policy exists 
and there are no cross-border transfers due to political reasons, the 
no bail-out clause is the essential guarantee of the functioning of the EMU.  
The first consequence of the no bail-out clause was the rise in the 
default risks of sovereign debtors in the EMU. While this has long been a 
theoretical possibility, it was regarded as a very low probability event. 
However, with the expansion and deepening of the sovereign debt crisis, 
the probability of government defaults has increased. The second 
consequence of the no bail-out clause is that according to the provisions of 
EU law, the ECB may not assume the role of the lender of last resort for 
the banking system, a role that otherwise may be very useful in crisis 
situations. This is different from the status of central banks in non-EMU 
countries. The balance between solidarity and autonomy is not 
proportional in the EMU. In the case of complete solidarity, when 
government debts are fully guaranteed, free riders and moral hazard 
appear. In the absence of any guarantee, speculation may loom. Mutual 
guarantees are missing in the EMU. The EMU was established without 
any insurance mechanism, and it was assumed that a monetary union could 
be successful without a budgetary or fiscal union (De Grauwe 2010). 
In spite of the structural problems, the lack of institutions, financial 
funds and crisis management mechanisms, the set of rules based on the 
three prohibitions did not inhibit the smooth functioning of the EMU in a 
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period when the global economy developed without major issues and 
global liquidity was abundant, although prior to its establishment several 
experts voiced their doubts over the long-term viability of the EMU (see in 
retrospect e.g., Feldstein 2012). In the late 1990s, the extent to which the 
EMU would meet the criteria for an optimum currency area was not clear 
to experts who were critical of the then current form of monetary 
integration.  
Optimum currency area theory focuses on the criteria that are essential 
for a country or group of countries to form an economic and monetary 
union. In an optimum currency area (a group of countries suitable for a 
monetary union), the following criteria are met:2 
First, the markets for production factors (labour and capital) are 
flexible and function well, the production factors are mobile, and therefore 
their prices are able to adjust to external price changes. 
Second, the area is internally homogeneous, implying that its member 
countries have similar economic structures and their business cycles are 
synchronised. The internal homogeneity of the area must have reached 
such a level that it is not threatened by asymmetric external shocks. The 
term asymmetric external shock means that countries forming the 
monetary union suffer shocks of different sizes from the same external 
event. The reason for this is that the commodity and geographical 
structures of their exports and imports, their reliance on imported energy 
and external finances, etc., are significantly different.  
Third, budgetary transfers are also available to fend off various 
economic disturbances including asymmetric shocks.  
The analysis of the applicability of these criteria to the EMU would go 
beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that, 
first, the no bail-out clause excluded budgetary transfers in the EMU. The 
reason for this was that monetary integration was not accompanied with 
the creation of a fiscal union. Budgetary transfers would have implied a 
transfer union with permanent transfers from richer to poorer countries as 
is the case within individual countries. Second, the internal homogeneity 
of the EMU must have not yet reached a level at which it is exempt from 
asymmetric shocks. Third, doubts over the mobility of the labour force and 
the flexibility of the labour market may also be justified. All of these 
deficiencies are demonstrated by relevant research. These deficiencies 
                                                          
2 The original concept of the optimal currency area was elaborated by Mundell 
(1961). The theory was amended and further developed by many scholars. The 
issue and other relevant problems are discussed in detail by, e.g., De Grauwe 
(2003). 
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mean that the criteria for an optimum currency area were not met from the 
outset. 
Nevertheless, of the three criteria for an optimum currency area, only 
one can be directly associated with the three prohibitions, namely the no 
bail-out clause. The structural weaknesses of inflexible labour markets and 
differences in macroeconomic structures were aggravated by deficiencies 
in the institutional and policy frameworks of the EMU. One such weakness 
was the primacy of real interest rate effect over the real exchange rate 
effect (Tomaso Padoa-Schioppa Group 2012). The one-size-fits-all 
monetary policy of the ECB led to excessive cyclical divergences and 
imbalances. Real interest rates were negative in the dynamically growing 
peripheral countries of the EMU (Ireland and Southern Europe, including 
Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy) that led to sharp price and wage 
increases and the subsequent deterioration of their relative international 
competitiveness resulting in a competitiveness crisis on one hand and 
credit and real estate bubbles and the accumulation of private and/or 
government debts on the other.  
Furthermore, in the absence of flexible labour markets and official 
transfers in the EMU, huge imbalances accumulated in conjunction with 
substantial current account surpluses in the core economies (such as 
Germany, Austria and the Netherlands) and enormous current account 
deficits in the peripheral member states. They generated a balance of 
payments crisis (EEAG 2012). The EMU regulatory system did not 
include guarantees for financing international imbalances (current account 
surpluses and deficits), managing financial shocks or implementing 
adjustments to restore international competitiveness (for details see e.g., 
EuroMemorandum Group 2010). The sovereign debt crisis called into 
question prior assumptions that international disequilibria are not relevant.  
In managing the sovereign debt crisis, rules based on the three 
prohibitions substantially impeded the ability to shift economic policy for 
both nation states and EU institutions. The constraints were particularly 
pronounced relative to the possible actions and economic policy tools of 
the EU’s competitors. The relaxation of some of the prohibitions played an 
important role in managing the sovereign debt crisis. 
3. Easing the exit from the EU 
According to Article 50 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU, 
the first part of the Treaty of Lisbon) that became effective as of 
1 December 2009, any member state may quit the EU. If an EU member 
state is simultaneously an EMU member, it has to exit the latter as well. 
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The TEU makes no explicit mention of exiting the EMU. However, 
according to the relevant EU laws governing monetary integration 
(regulations concerning the introduction of the euro, the irrevocable fixing 
of the conversion rates of the national currencies against the euro, the 
irreversibility of the EMU, etc.) that are based on the basic treaties, 
member states are not allowed to leave the EMU. This implies that an 
EMU member state is barred from leaving the EMU while remaining in 
the EU. Because an exit from the EMU is unprecedented, there are no 
formal procedures or mechanisms for departing the EU in general and the 
EMU in particular. 
EU law does not allow for the exclusion of any member state from the 
EU and the EMU. Although from the standpoint of the ECB, it may be 
feasible to exclude a member state from the EMU through indirect means, 
it is not possible through current legal provisions. An example of such 
indirect means would be the ECB refusing liquidity to member state banks 
that suffered runs on their deposits. This was a perceived danger in Greece 
in May 2012. The legal possibility of exclusion would undermine the 
Economic and Monetary Union by sending markets the message that the 
union is no more than an exchange rate mechanism, which individual 
countries may join or leave, depending on their actual economic situation 
(The Economist 2008). 
The provisions concerning exit from the EU have nothing to do with 
the sovereign debt crisis and attempts to ameliorate it with economic 
policies. The elaboration of the Treaty of Lisbon began well before the 
outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis. However, the possibility of exiting 
the EU and the EMU has received a different interpretation in light of the 
crisis. The major reason for a member state to leave the EMU is to regain 
its independence in exchange rate policy. This would make it possible to 
remedy or at least mitigate the negative effects of the crisis by devaluing 
the national currency that would replace the euro at least in the short run.  
From the legal point of view, an exit from the EMU could be feasible 
in two ways, at least in principle. First, the TEU and other relevant legal 
rules regarding the EMU and the euro could be explicitly modified to 
allow member states to leave the EMU and remain in the EU. Such a 
change in the basic treaty seems nearly out of the question under normal 
conditions. It is not realistic to assume that 27 EU member states could 
agree on a new treaty or the necessary modifications to the existing one at 
an intergovernmental conference within a reasonable timeframe. In 
addition, lengthy negotiations would also have an adverse impact on 
financial stability. The legal codification of exit criteria would also weaken 
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the credibility of the EMU. This possibility could only become reality in a 
very severe crisis.  
Second, apart from the rationality of such a decision, exiting the EMU 
is the autonomous, independent decision of a member state. To avoid or 
moderate capital flight, exit measures must to be taken on a single day or 
within a few days. In this sense, a managed exit based on negotiations with 
other member states and EU institutions would hardly be possible. Of 
course the detailed conditions for the exit would have to be clarified 
subsequently in long and complicated negotiations.  
Assuming that a member state leaves the EMU and remains in the EU, 
it would face serious legal problems. In this case, EU law would remain 
effective in the departing member country. “If it abandoned the euro in all 
domestic contracts, but maintained it in all foreign contracts, the 
consequence would be a flood of well-founded lawsuits. Every citizen of 
the departing country would have a legal case against its own government 
– and possibly against the other member states as well. A euro zone exit 
would constitute discrimination on grounds of nationality – the biggest 
“no, no” under EU law” (Münchau 2012d).  
If a member state exits both the EMU and the EU, it will be isolated in 
Europe. The EU would impose tariffs on its goods. The Schengen 
Agreement would be suspended with the direct consequence of the 
introduction of visas. To halt capital flight, the departing country would 
have to introduce restrictions on capital flows. The departing country 
would lose access to transfers from the structural funds and the Cohesion 
Fund. 
In addition to legal factors, there are also economic arguments against 
the partial or complete break-up of the EMU. First, it would trigger chaos 
or uncontrollable developments. Second, it would entail unbearable costs 
on those concerned. According to model calculations, the direct losses 
from a break-up or the exit of strong and weak member states would 
amount to 20–50% of the GDPs of the countries concerned. Germany 
would suffer losses amounting to 20% of GDP and those of Greece would 
be 50%.3 These are approximate figures. Modelling the consequences is 
difficult because the effects are unprecedented. 
With respect to the most troubled countries, the most probable case 
may be that Greece would exit the EMU. Then it will have to balance its 
primary budget (deficit excluding interest payments) immediately, 
otherwise it would not be able to finance its deficit. As in the ensuing 
chaos, mass corporate and household defaults, increasing unemployment, 
recession, etc., general government revenues will decrease, a primary 
                                                          
3 The figures come from an analysis by UBS. Source: The Economist (2011). 
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surplus should be achieved rather than a balanced budget. The Greek 
primary general government deficit amounted to 2.5% of GDP in 2011; it 
is expected to total 1% in 2012. This would necessitate a 20–30% wage 
reduction in the public sector. Under these circumstances, the collapse of 
the public sector would be unavoidable, and the government would not be 
able to rely on underpaid civil servants to maintain law and order. If the 
government were to default, Greek banks would be cut off from the 
liquidity facilities of the ECB. If the Bank of Greece did not comply with 
relevant EU rules, Greece could be excluded from the EMU’s payment 
system and the government would be forced to reintroduce the drachma.  
The new drachma4 replacing euro would depreciate quickly (likely by 
30–40%, but more pessimistic estimates place the decline at 80–90%), the 
subsequent inflation increase would improve the external competitiveness 
of Greece through the contraction of real wages. Nevertheless, this 
possibility could only be modestly exploited because manufacturing 
accounts for merely 7% of Greek GDP. The role of tourism could be more 
significant, as its share of GDP is 18% and that of maritime transport is 
another 12%. Given the relatively low importance of manufacturing, 
Greece is not integrated in the EU supplier network and German 
corporations within it. Consequently, the acceleration of GDP growth in 
the EU in general and Germany in particular would not provide a great 
deal of a boost to Greek manufacturing. In addition, the depreciation of the 
new drachma would trigger a strong inflationary spiral. 
Devaluation and the subsequent increased inflation would lead to the 
loss of wealth due to plummeting real estate prices and the devaluation of 
financial assets. With the expected rapid devaluation of the new drachma, 
the costs of financing government debt denominated in euros would soar. 
The paradoxical feature of this strategy is that to avoid hyperinflation and 
restore international competitiveness, Greece has to pursue prudent fiscal 
policy and accomplish structural reforms without external funding that are 
similar to those requested by EU institutions and the IMF in exchange for 
the financial rescue packages (Münchau 2012a). However, the 
depreciation of the national currency may weaken the pressure for 
structural reforms faced by the government. In summary, an exit from the 
EMU would not solve the Greek economy’s fundamental issues such as 
the limited export sector, the lack of competitiveness and substantial 
external imbalances.  
                                                          
4 According to various sources, the Greek government would likely declare a bank 
holiday after announcing the country’s exit from the EMU, and the euro banknotes 
held by the country’s banks would be stamped to demonstrate the reintroduction of 
the drachma. 
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In the case of a Greek exit from the EMU, bank runs in other 
endangered countries (Portugal, Spain and perhaps Italy) are certain to 
occur, as economic actors would transfer their monetary holdings to safer 
EMU member states. To neutralise this threat, the ECB would have to 
provide additional liquidity to the banking systems of the countries 
endangered by the negative spill-over effects. It should be noted, however, 
that at present the major Greek political parties do not desire to quit the 
EMU. According to public opinion polls, the majority of the Greek 
population does not support an exit either.  
Despite the severe negative effects, many experts argue that considering 
the existing set of rules governing the EMU, the most indebted member 
countries (Greece, Portugal and Spain) should quit the EMU (see, e.g., 
Arnab and Roubini 2012). They believe that the long term advantages 
created by such an exit will exceed short-term disadvantages. Apart from 
the fact that the author of this paper does not find these arguments 
convincing, a discussion of these views would go beyond the scope of this 
report. If Spain and Italy leave the EMU, they would likely default on their 
external debt. Such an act would probably lead to the collapse of the 
European financial system (Münchau 2012e). A Greek, Spanish or Italian 
exit would cause investors to perceive that EMU membership is reversible, 
implying the implicit reintroduction of currency risks (Kramer 2012). 
In spite of the great uncertainty and enormous costs, the partial or 
complete dissolution of the EMU cannot be excluded, but the probability 
of such events seems to be rather low. Nevertheless, in the absence of 
counterbalancing forces, this probability may increase, particularly if the 
political, financial and economic tensions surrounding Greece or other 
troubled EU member countries intensify. Even a low probability of exit 
may create uncertainty among economic actors and bolster demand for the 
safest US and German government securities, increase capital outflows 
from the EMU, and weaken the euro’s relative position against other major 
currencies. The Deutsche Bundesbank may have considered the exit of 
individual member states from the EMU when President Jens Weidemann 
proposed the securitisation of German surpluses valued at €500 billion that 
had been accumulated in the TARGET2 central payment system and 
which has managed settlements between the central banks of countries 
where euro is legal tender since 2007. By seeking insurance against the 
collapse of the euro, the Deutsche Bundesbank does not regard the 
dissolution of the EMU as a zero probability event (Münchau 2012b).  
The insolvency of governments may also endanger the solvency of the 
debtor countries’ central banks. This may impose substantial losses on the 
central banks of creditor member states that are likely to be covered by the 
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taxpayers of the respective countries. This is a disguised fiscal transfer 
that cannot be sustained.  
The major guarantee against the complete break-up of the EMU is of 
an economic nature, namely, the high cost of such an event. None of the 
member states would benefit from the partial or the complete break-up of 
the EMU. In spite of the sovereign debt crisis, the costs of maintaining the 
EMU are much lower than those of its break-up. There is broad 
recognition by the major political forces in the EU that member states have 
little future outside the EMU.5 As the probability of a partial or complete 
break-up increases, exit costs may decrease. Discussions on managing the 
crisis focus on, first, the distribution of burdens across the remaining 
member states and economic actors rather than the question of whether the 
system is worth saving. The answer to the latter question is clear 
(The Economist 2012b). Second, the unwillingness of the governments of 
individual member states to abandon their sovereignty or at least parts of it 
inhibit a move towards stronger monetary and fiscal integration. 
At first glance, the demise of the EMU would involve the cancellation 
of a number of obligations enshrined in the Treaty of Lisbon. Furthermore, 
the complete and disorderly break-up of the EMU would also lead to the 
collapse of the EU, including the single markets for goods, services, 
capital and labour. The benefits of European integration achieved over the 
past 55 years would disappear.  
The other argument against the break-up is one of a political nature. 
Member states invested substantial political capital in the EMU over the 
past 10–15 years; they do not want to write it off. The political 
commitment to the euro is strong in a defensive sense but is not sufficient 
to support stronger financial integration. 
Apart from the possibility of a partial or complete break-up, economic 
actors regard the elaboration of contingency scenarios for the EMU at both 
the macro- and microeconomic levels as necessary. Contingency scenarios 
were prepared, i.a., by British and US investment banks for their clients 
rather than by EU institutions for the general public. With the escalation of 
the crisis in Greece in May and June 2012, increasing numbers of such 
                                                          
5 Of the $11 trillion worth of euro-area debt outstanding, $4 trillion must be 
regarded as at risk in the near term in a restructuring process. The capital markets 
of the EU, including that of $185 trillion in outstanding euro-denominated 
derivative contracts would be in turmoil, causing large-scale capital flight to the 
US and Asia (Vallée 2012). The general view among experts is that the disorderly 
break-up of the EMU would be a much greater shock than the default of Lehman 
Brothers in 2008. 
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contingency scenarios appeared that were elaborated by banks and large 
corporations.  
It is difficult to judge whether discussions of contingency scenarios on 
the macro level would trigger market panic or help to reduce uncertainty.6 
Fearing panicked reactions, until recently EU institutions refrained from 
compiling contingency scenarios under the otherwise justifiable assumption 
that they cannot be kept secret. Such a worst case contingency scenario 
should discuss the ways in which financial assets and liabilities would be 
redenominated after the managed break-up of the EMU. This is 
particularly important if the EMU collapses with the demise of the euro. It 
should be noted, however, that the majority of assets and liabilities are 
subject to UK law rather than EU law. It is unclear how they can be 
redenominated. An interesting suggestion is that in the case of a break-up, 
the euro should be replaced by ECU-2 (European Currency Unit – ECU), 
similar to the original ECU (Nordvig 2012). The EMU and the euro have 
developed to a point where the return to individual member state 
currencies is unlikely, and the only future recourse would be the use of the 
ECU as a basket currency. Nevertheless, the tensions accumulated within 
the EMU can only be eased in the absence of its partial or complete break-
up. 
4. The softening of the prohibition on government 
default 
It is worth considering the possibility of government default because it 
is doubtful whether indebted countries in general, and Greece in particular, 
can repay their government debts. In addition, large government debts 
could stifle economic growth for an extended period independent from the 
issue of repayment. It is assumed that the costs of avoiding a government 
default, in terms of external rescue packages, are smaller than those of the 
default itself, including its spill-over effects on the rest of the EMU.  
Government default may take two forms. First, it could be accompanied 
by an exit from the EMU or, second, it could be accomplished within the 
EMU. The consequences of an exit have already been discussed. This 
implies at first glance that government default does not automatically 
imply that the defaulting countries would exit the EMU. Nevertheless, in 
                                                          
6 In this context, the Wolfson prize should be mentioned. The British Tory offered 
GBP251 thousand to the authors of the best plan for the dismantling of the EMU 
(see, e.g., Rachman 2012). For some details of the proposal, see The Economist 
(2012c). 
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the case of Greece a government default would also result in the country 
exiting the EMU, as it would likely only be able to obtain financing by 
reintroducing a national currency. This also holds for Spain and other 
indebted member states.  
Government defaults in the EMU can be either disorderly or managed. 
In a disorderly default, the government stops servicing its debt without 
consulting and cooperating with concerned parties including EU institutions, 
member states, banks and the private sector. The revenues of the Greek 
government are not sufficient to finance the public sector. Not only would 
public services collapse, but banks would as well, because they would be 
forced to write off the government securities they own. Following a 
disorderly government default, it would be difficult to find investors 
willing to finance the Greek government. A disorderly government default 
may easily lead to the country exiting the EMU, which would have 
negative implications for the rest of the EMU through contagion effects. 
An orderly or managed default is based on negotiations between the 
parties concerned. This raises the issue of the creation of a European Crisis 
Resolution Mechanism, as proposed by Bruegel, based on two pillars 
(Gianviti et al. 2010). The first pillar is a procedure to initiate and conduct 
negotiations between a sovereign debtor with unsustainable levels of debt 
and its creditors resulting in an agreement. The second includes the 
provision of financial assistance to EMU member states in an effort to 
resolve the crisis.  
A government default within the EMU would not improve the 
competitiveness of the Greek economy or any other defaulting member 
state. As devaluation is not allowed, the forces driving economic growth 
would likely be external, in the form of European investment programs. 
The precondition for this is the restoration of credibility and co-operation 
between the interested parties (Münchau 2012a). The probability of this 
scenario is very low.  
The weaker form of government default, which can be considered an 
orderly or managed one, is the write-off of a certain portion of government 
debt. The dilemmas here are the following. 1) Do the advantages deriving 
from the decrease in government debt and related debt service burdens 
exceed the financial and economic losses that are associated with the 
decline in credibility (that may spill-over to the rest of the EMU)? 2) Are 
the costs of government default lower than those of a potential bail-out?  
In Greece, 74% of government debt held by private investors was 
written off as losses in March 2012. The haircut of more than €100 billion 
was one of the largest in economic history. Representatives of EU 
institutions frequently underline the fact that the partial write-off of Greek 
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government debt having only involved the private sector was an 
exceptional case; it cannot be regarded as a precedent and is not applicable 
to other EMU member states. This implies that these other states must 
employ all available measures to avoid government default. Nevertheless, 
after the Greek precedent, investors buying the government securities of 
indebted member states are likely to be more cautious, and this may make 
it more difficult to finance other troubled EMU member states. A 
sovereign debt default mechanism may have other negative effects; it may 
nurture moral hazard and speculation (De Grauwe 2010).  
A Greek exit from the EMU or a government default would involve 
Greek debts worth €121 billion owed to official creditors, €27 billion 
owed to the IMF and €155 billion directly owed to the euro system 
(comprising the ECB and the 17 national central banks in the EMU). The 
last figure includes €110 billion provided directly to Greece through the 
TARGET2 payment system (Vallée 2012). These figures demonstrate that 
a Greek government default could have far-reaching consequences on the 
euro zone. If we consider the potential candidates for government default, 
according to estimates based on official data the claims of the euro system 
on troubled periphery countries amount to approximately €1.1 trillion, 
corresponding to 200% of the broadly defined capital of the euro zone 
(Vallée 2012). These figures indicate quite considerable risks for bank 
capital and taxpayers and represent a strong argument for avoiding 
government default in the EMU. The risk of the fear of contagion, 
including capital flight, cannot be quantified.  
Because bank portfolios contain significant shares of government 
securities, the recapitalisation of banks in the EU and the EMU envisaged 
in mid-2012 by the European Council can be considered, inter alia, a 
precautionary move to dampen the effects of potential government 
defaults. The new idea of a banking union will be discussed below.  
Despite the softening of the prohibition on government default, the 
roll-over of government debt is still more difficult in the EMU than outside 
it. Countries outside the EMU are less likely to be subject to liquidity 
crises than EMU member states because, first, the devaluation of the 
exchange rate will generate buyers for government securities, albeit 
presumably at a weak exchange rate and high yields. Second, the national 
central bank can assume the role of lender of last resort and inflate the debt 
by excessive money creation. In this way, a government default can be 
avoided. In the case of fixed exchange rates or a common currency and the 
absence of a national central bank, there may be no demand for 
government securities at high yields and the government may default. This 
may explain why Spain’s rating is worse despite the lower level of 
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government debt relative to GDP than that of the UK despite its higher 
level of indebtedness.7 As a consequence, the indebtedness levels should 
be much lower in economic and monetary unions than outside them. 
5. The modification of the no bail-out clause:  
financial rescue packages and bail-out funds 
In the wake of the Greek sovereign debt crisis that began in autumn 
2009, as well as the subsequent crises in Ireland and Portugal, the 
softening of the no bail-out clause in the Treaty on the European Union 
became necessary. According to an evaluation of EU institutions and the 
leaders of major EU member states, defaults on the part of the countries 
mentioned – including spill-over effects – would have entailed higher 
costs than bail-outs financed by credit.  
With respect to the legal basis: “Member states referred to Article 122 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, according to 
which assistance by EU countries is allowed if member states are faced 
with difficulties that are beyond their control. Before the actual rescue 
packages this article was interpreted in such a way that it cannot be 
applied to the bailing out of debtor countries. Since the resolution of the 
European Council as of 8/9 May 2010, governments of EMU member 
states have based their bail-out actions on it by arguing that the sovereign 
debt crisis endangered the solvency of individual member states and 
posted a threat to the financial stability of the Economic and Monetary 
Union” (Sinn 2010, 5). Nevertheless, the Economic and Monetary Union 
has faced crises in specific indebted EMU member states rather than a 
systemic crisis since that time (Sinn 2010, 7). “The use of this provision to 
the legal justification of bail-outs may give ground to different 
interpretations by the constitutional courts of EMU member states. 
However, this seems to be a smaller risk for the time being than the rather 
complicated modification of the Treaty of Lisbon to provide a clear legal 
basis for bailing out troubled EMU member states. The legal basis of bail-
outs is still rather shaky” (Sinn 2010, 7). 
A European Council decision (European Council 2011) added the 
following paragraph to Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union: “3. Member States whose currency is the euro may 
establish a stability mechanism to be activated if indispensable to 
safeguard the stability of the euro-area as a whole. The granting of any 
required financial assistance under the mechanism will be made subject to 
                                                          
7 See details based on the explanation of Paul De Grauwe in Wolf (2011). 
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strict conditionality.” As this mechanism is designed to safeguard the 
financial stability of the euro-area as a whole, Article 122(2) of the TFEU 
will no longer be needed for such purposes. 
In light of the circumstances, three funds were established, which did 
not conform to the spirit of the original provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon, 
to bail out member states coping with funding difficulties. The first fund is 
the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism with €60 billion that 
expired on 30 June 2012 and is designed to aid EU member states outside 
the EMU. The second is the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) 
with €440 billion in effective lending capacity that expires as of 30 June 
2013. Its successor will be the third fund, called the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM), with €500 billion in effective lending capacity that will 
be operative as of June 30th 2013. The EFSF and the ESM are likely to 
work simultaneously until mid-2013. The combined lending capacity of 
the two funds will amount to €700 billion, out of which fresh money will 
total €500 billion, the remainder being parts of the on-going Greek, 
Portuguese and Irish programs. These efforts will be supported by a 
contingency reserve valued at €240 billion. The overall size of the funds 
will reach €940 billion. They are operated jointly by the European 
Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund. The difference between the EFSF and the ESM is that the loans of 
the ESM are senior to those of private investors, in other words, 
government defaults will be possible at rather limited risk to the budgets of 
lender countries. In the case of the EFSF, the lending member states are 
burdened with the costs of government default. The creation of bail-out 
funds can be considered an initial shift towards an optimum currency area 
where budgetary transfers are available to fend off various economic 
disturbances. The disputed issues include, first, the size of the funds 
required to match the potential risks and, second, the ways in which they 
are used, including conditionality.  
Until recently, Greece, Ireland and Portugal have received financial 
packages. In June 2012, Spain was awarded €100 billion and Cyprus 
applied for assistance. The sizes of the funds fall short of the total needs of 
EMU member states endangered by potential government default. In 
principle, the optimal sources of the bail-out funds have to be sufficient to 
guarantee that new government securities can be issued to roll over the 
government debt of troubled sovereign debtors, such as Greece, Portugal, 
Ireland, Spain, Italy, France and Belgium, until the EU issues common 
euro bonds. According to the calculations of Bloomberg and the IMF, €2.5 
trillion – €3 trillion would be necessary until 2015 (Bloomberg Business 
Week 2011). In addition, if temporary and transfer items are excluded, the 
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actual amount of funds that can be used for bail-outs amounts to only €500 
billion in the long run. This is significantly less than the amount necessary 
to guarantee the government debt of all of the member states potentially 
facing financial difficulties. However, the available money is sufficient to 
prevent government default in smaller countries (such as Greece, Portugal 
and Ireland), but it is insufficient to bail-out Spain.  
On one hand, increased financing for the funds may have psychological 
implications. The larger the size of the funds, the more convincing the 
deterrence, and the lower the probability of their deployment. Therefore, 
the risk of political debates challenging solidarity within the EU 
diminishes (Editorial 2012). Another interesting psychological question is 
whether the interventions of the European Stability Mechanism avoid 
crises or, on the contrary, trigger them. 
On the other hand, increasing the sizes of the funds is a signal to the 
US, China and other non-EU member states in general and those 
belonging to the G20 in particular that they, too, may wish to increase their 
contributions to the IMF’s global crisis management funds that were 
promised in April 2012 in the amount of $430 million.  
The further extension of the EFSF and ESM funds runs the risk that 
international rating agencies will downgrade the best debtors because both 
the EFSF and ESM raise funds in international money and capital markets. 
Another political obstacle to further increases in the funds is that an 
addition to German’s existing €211 billion contribution is subject to 
parliamentary approval. Domestic political issues may make the approval 
of new sums uncertain. In addition, the simple fact that the German 
contribution temporarily exceeds the approved ceiling may provoke 
political disputes.  
Furthermore, multilateral programs seem to approach their political 
limits. The liabilities faced by the individual member states are not 
sufficient to justify increasing the size of the bail-out funds. It is necessary 
to pool or share liability across the member states by issuing Eurobonds, 
etc. (Münchau 2012c). Nevertheless, the ESM can be perceived as a 
specific form of transfer mechanism among member states. Some experts 
regard its establishment as a further step towards a transfer union. 
Nonetheless, the bail-out packages and the EFSF and ESM shift risks from 
banks to taxpayers rather than improving the competitiveness of the 
beneficiary countries.  
The provision of financial aid from the bail-out funds is tied to 
conditions designed to reduce general government spending by introducing, 
inter alia, austerity measures and structural reforms. Until recently, 
beneficiary member states attempted to meet stringent, self-imposed 
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austerity conditions. Nevertheless, a new situation may emerge if a 
beneficiary country fails to comply with austerity and structural reform 
conditions wilfully and permanently. This risk is quite plausible in Greece, 
where the stringent measures implemented in previous years combined 
with the subsequent recession fuelled political and social resistance to 
further austerity. The Greek public opposes the program designed by the 
European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund. The situation is similar in the other heavily indebted 
member states. If wilfully and permanently non-compliant program 
beneficiaries are denied further funding, the exit of the respective member 
state cannot be avoided, entailing the risk of spill-over and contagion 
effects for other endangered countries. If further funding is not denied, the 
result may be “the creation of an open-ended, uncapped transfer union 
without the surrender of national sovereignty to the supranational 
European level” (Buiter 2012). 
6. The modification of the no bail-out clause:  
changes in the ECB’s tasks 
Faced with the financial and economic crisis, the European Central 
Bank also modified its views on bail-outs. First, the ECB began to buy the 
government bonds of EMU member states facing financial difficulties in 
2009 in the secondary market. The purchases were beyond the size 
required for conducting its monetary policy operations. In the framework 
of its Securities Market Program, the ECB purchased government 
securities valued at more than €200 billion. Moreover, the ECB sold high-
quality government bonds to neutralise the inflationary effects of these 
purchases. Although this type of operation stabilised the yields on 
sovereign debt, it drove banks to sell off the government bonds of weak 
EMU member states, which are hence being accumulated by the ECB. 
“Since the start of 2007, the ECB purchased financial assets totalling 1.7 
trillion euros, expanding its portfolio from 13% to over 30% of the euro 
zone’s GDP” (Mallaby 2012, 7). This figure represented more than eight 
years of Greek GDP.  
Second, the ECB offered unlimited liquidity loans to banks at an 
auction held in June 2009 with one-year maturities. The amount totalled 
€442 billion. Through these operations, the ECB reduced short term 
interest rates to US and UK levels (The Economist 2012a).  
Third, the threat of a new recession loomed, bank capitalisation 
reached critical levels and investors only purchased the safest government 
securities in December 2011. As a response, the ECB offered commercial 
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banks unlimited liquidity loans for three years against any collateral at a 
1% interest rate (Long-term Refinancing Operation – LTRO). The action 
was repeated in late February 2012. Commercial banks borrowed more 
than €1000 billion under this scheme, although the assets of the banking 
system grew by only €503 billion if expiring loans and deposits at the 
ECB are taken into account. These measures are similar to the quantitative 
easing practices of the US Fed and the Bank of England.  
In this scheme, the ECB formally observed the no bail-out clause of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Nevertheless, the 
LTRO can be regarded as a disguised bail-out. In Germany the ECB was 
criticised for not fully respecting the provisions of the EU Treaty that 
prohibit monetary financing of government debts. The ECB circumvented 
the formal legal provisions of the EU Treaty because commercial banks 
were provided loans rather than the governments directly. As the ECB 
accepted government bonds deposited by banks as collateral, the LTRO is 
an indirect means of bailing out indebted governments. It should be noted 
that the ECB is legally allowed to accept government securities as 
collateral.  
Although the motivations for their introduction were more diverse, the 
loans provided by the ECB under the LTRO framework amended or 
extended the financial sources of the rescue funds. However, decision 
making in the ECB is more rapid than in the EFSF and ESM, and the ECB 
is more credible than the bail-out fund institutions. 
There is insufficient space in the present article to analyse the effects of 
the LTRO in detail. However, it should be mentioned briefly that the 
ECB’s primary objective with the LTRO was to reduce the yields of 
government securities and other risky assets and thereby fend off liquidity 
crises in some indebted EMU member states (particularly in Spain and 
Italy). The LTRO also contributed to the recapitalisation of banks, thereby 
preventing an eventual banking crisis. The LTRO undoubtedly helped to 
ease liquidity tensions in the EMU, but it was not appropriate to improve 
solvency and reduce general government debt, let alone improve 
competitiveness in indebted EMU member states and dampen current 
account imbalances in the EMU.8 The three-year maturity of the loans 
provided governments and banks with time to make adjustments and 
reforms.  
                                                          
8 EU policies “have failed to recognise the possibility of insolvency and have 
addressed all crises as if they were pure liquidity crises; they have failed to address 
systematically the interdependence between banking and sovereign crises and 
cross-country interdependence; and they have been reactive rather than proactive, 
squandering credibility because of inadequate responses” (Darvas et al. 2011, 1). 
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The risks of the LTRO are rather diverse. First, commercial banks may 
face difficulties in December 2014 and February 2015 in raising the 
amounts needed to repay the loans (Jenkins 2012). In addition, the three-
year maturity is rather short for many banks.  
Second, commercial banks may become too dependent on the ECB’s 
inexpensive loans. If they buy government securities using these loans 
(this is a carry trade, and governments are prone to encourage it), the 
relationships between banks and governments may intensify. The 
relationship between the sovereign debt of financially troubled countries 
and the actual state of the banking sector will be reinforced (The 
Economist 2012b). With government securities in their portfolios, banks 
may be more vulnerable during difficult periods of the sovereign debt 
crisis. Therefore, sovereign debt crises may easily lead to bank crises.  
Third, inexpensive loans may foster money and capital market bubbles 
similar to those that preceded the global financial and economic crisis, but 
with sovereign debt securities being purchased in this case. With the 
LTRO, the ECB may be unwillingly sowing the seeds of the next crisis 
(Milne and Watkins 2012). 
Fourth, the central banks in the US and UK purchased government 
securities. In other words, sovereign risk was transferred from the public 
sector to the central bank. In the EMU, sovereign risk is still being carried 
by the private sector, namely the ECB shifted it to the balance sheets of 
undercapitalised commercial banks. In the US, the Fed directly provides 
loans to banks with a wide range of control mechanisms. In the EMU, the 
ECB offers banks refinancing, therefore its monetary policy is less 
predictable than that of the Fed. To add insult to injury, ECB monetary 
policy remains tight; there is room for a further reduction in its reference 
rate, although it was reduced from 1% to 0.75% in July 2012. 
Fifth, there is no guarantee that the commercial banks that borrowed 
from the ECB are willing to buy the government securities of EMU 
member states with high yields and high risks or that increased liquidity 
can be channelled to the real economy.  
Sixth, it is difficult to assess how long the ECB’s last two liquidity 
injections through the LTRO will last. There are signs that their effects 
tend to fade away slowly.  
Finally, the inexpensive loans provided by the ECB have reduced the 
pressure on both governments and commercial banks to implement 
reforms. For governments, the unconditional and unlimited purchase of 
government securities also leads to moral hazard problems.  
By providing commercial banks with unlimited loans against 
government bonds (as collateral at specific LTRO auctions) the ECB 
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essentially assumed the de facto role of the banking system’s lender of last 
resort with some limitations (although the scheme cannot be considered a 
European Monetary Fund at present). However, this has yet to be declared 
officially, causing uncertainty among economic actors to remain. Germany 
opposes this mainly because of its inflationary impact in the long run. 
Nevertheless, in sharp crisis situations the benefits of crisis prevention 
outweigh the long-term costs in terms of inflation. 
7. Measures aiming at the overhaul  
of the institutional system 
The objective of softening the three prohibitions was to gain the time 
needed to take further measures at both the EU and the EMU levels to 
correct institutional deficiencies. They included the improvement of 
economic governance (the Stability and Growth Pact, Euro Pact, Six Pack, 
Treaty on Stability, Co-ordination and Governance in the Economic and 
Monetary Union, etc.), prevention (Excessive Imbalance Procedure), etc. 
The common objective of these legal rules is to reinforce fiscal discipline 
and thus somehow compensate for the lack of a fiscal union. The analysis 
of these measures is beyond the scope of this paper.  
The most important proposals concerning the future of the EMU were 
submitted to the European Council in late June 2012. They contained, inter 
alia, an integrated financial framework including integrated supervision to 
ensure the effective application of prudential rules, risk control and crisis 
prevention throughout the EU; a European deposit insurance scheme to 
strengthen the credibility of the existing arrangements and secure eligible 
deposits at all credit institutions; and a European bank resolution scheme 
funded by contributions from financial institutions to provide assistance to 
banks (Rompuy 2012). This issue was also addressed previously by the 
Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa Group. 
The concept is referred to as a banking union and it should be 
elaborated in detail. Based on the available information, the banking union 
should comprise all 27 member states of the EU to avoid the fragmentation 
of the single market for financial services.  
Banking supervision would be delegated to the ECB. Bail-out funds 
could go directly to banks (the ESM will be allowed to recapitalise banks 
directly) rather than to governments, therefore they would not increase the 
government debts of the member states involved. This rule has already 
been applied to Spain. In addition, the ESM will be allowed to buy 
government bonds in secondary markets and thereby stabilise the market.  
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The common deposit insurance system could reduce the risk of bank 
runs in vulnerable member states. If a country is likely to leave the EMU 
and deposits are guaranteed in euros, people may borrow heavily in their 
local markets and deposit the money in their bank accounts. Their debts 
would be redenominated while their savings would be protected. This 
could be considered a direct transfer from the rest of the euro zone to the 
periphery (The Economist 2012d). 
According to calculations by Barclays, an insurance fund would have 
to cover €11 trillion in deposits. For the banking industry to raise an 
amount worth 1.4% of assets, EMU banks would have to be taxed a fifth 
of their annual earnings for five years. According to more conservative 
calculations, more than €100 billion would have to be raised (The 
Economist 2012d).  
The banking union could dismantle the link between governments and 
banks, creating a more stable financial environment in the EU. It can be 
considered a first step towards a fiscal union, although common 
responsibility and liability are rather limited. 
8. Summary and conclusions 
The sovereign debt crisis that evolved in the Economic and Monetary 
Union was fundamentally the result of economic policies in general and 
unsustainable fiscal policies in particular, pursued by member states, rather 
than the introduction of the common currency. The external and the 
internal stability of the euro have yet to be challenged. During the global 
financial and economic crisis, the euro provided EMU member states with 
protection against internal exchange rate shocks. After its introduction, 
conversion costs, exchange rate risks and uncertainties disappeared and, as 
a result, transaction costs decreased in intra-EMU trade, which also 
boosted GDP growth.  
Nevertheless, the basic legal rules governing the EMU combined with 
some specific features of member states have long mitigated or even 
hidden economic disequilibria and tensions that developed both within and 
among member states for a long time. They were primarily the 
consequences of the fact that, first, the EMU was not an optimum currency 
area; second, EU legal rules were not efficient enough to enforce fiscal 
discipline and inhibit the accumulation of private sector debts in member 
states. The absence of the first two preconditions for an optimum currency 
area (flexible factor markets and internal homogeneity) was of minor 
importance in contrast to critiques written prior to the establishment of the 
EMU; whereas the third criterion (the availability of budgetary transfers) 
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was not compatible with the notion of a monetary union in the absence of 
a fiscal one. Under the given circumstances, exchange rate and liquidity 
crises were avoided.  
However, the economic disequilibria and tensions that had accumulated 
as a consequence of the global financial and economic crisis, the lack of an 
optimum currency area and the inadequate policies pursued by member 
states since the launch of the EMU in 1999 led to a sovereign debt crisis to 
which the institutional and regulatory framework of the Economic and 
Monetary Union also contributed. In addition, with the establishment of 
the EMU, its member states lost the majority of the traditional, national 
crisis management tools, which were replaced by very weak tools and 
mechanisms and funds that were endowed with limited financial resources 
at the level of economic integration.  
The sovereign debt crisis challenged the three pillars of the Economic 
and Monetary Union. The three prohibitions (no exits, no defaults and no 
bail-outs) were originally incorporated in the Treaty of Maastricht and 
secondary EU legislation to ensure the credibility of monetary integration. 
They did not constrain economic development and economic policy in the 
period of excessive global liquidity, but they did restrain the EMU member 
states’ manoeuvrability during the sovereign debt crisis. With the softening 
of two of the three prohibitions (no government defaults and no bail-outs), 
the economic policy tools and crisis management mechanisms in the EMU 
became more similar but far from identical to those prevailing in countries 
outside the EMU.  
As far as the first pillar is concerned, the Treaty on the European 
Union (the first part of the Treaty of Lisbon) allows any member state to 
exit the EMU if it simultaneously leaves the EU. This is independent of 
the sovereign debt crisis. The exit of a member state, be it a strong or weak 
one, from the EMU would pose insurmountable legal difficulties and 
would constitute economic suicide due to the costs, despite the arguments 
of economists stressing the presumed advantages of such a move. The 
major guarantees for the EMU are the enormous cost of its dissolution, the 
fear of the collapse of the EU and the loss of the tremendous amount of 
political capital invested in it over the past 10–15 years. Therefore, 
assuming rational behaviour on the part of governments, no member state 
is likely to make use of the legal possibility of exiting the EU. Despite the 
great uncertainty and enormous costs, the partial or complete dissolution 
of the EMU cannot be excluded, but its probability is relatively low under 
more or less “normal” circumstances. Nevertheless, contingency scenarios 
for the break-up of the EMU may be justified.  
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In the EMU, where their debts are issued in a currency over which they 
do not have full control, member states cannot rely on devaluation as a 
means of managing the crisis and restoring international competitiveness. 
Therefore, the likelihood of default is rather high. Devaluation could only 
be an option if member states leave the EMU. Therefore, the means of 
making adjustments and restoring international competitiveness include 
the consolidation of the general government through fiscal austerity, 
structural reforms and internal devaluation, in terms of reducing prices 
and unit labour costs, which are rather painful and may have adverse 
effects on GDP growth.  
The prohibition on government default was only partially softened 
because, regarding economic actors on the one hand, it was limited to the 
write-off of government debts held by private investors (the weak form of 
government default) and, on the other, in geographical terms to Greece, 
establishing a precedent. Because of its limited scope and size (in terms of 
the exclusion of public debt), its impact on easing debt’s drag on Greek 
economic growth is likely to remain modest.  
The softening of the no bail-out clause included establishing rescue 
funds, the ECB’s purchases of government bonds in secondary markets 
and the indirect involvement of the ECB in the purchase of government 
bonds through the provision of loans to commercial banks against 
government bond collateral, based on an innovative interpretation of 
existing basic EU legal rules. The legal basis for the softening of the no 
bail-out clause is rather uncertain. In addition, the rescue funds and ECB 
loans assist in the creation of conditions necessary for the member states to 
make adjustments rather than substituting for policy measures to be taken 
by the EU and the individual member states.  
It is also theoretically possible for the ECB to assume the role of lender 
of last resort should the necessity arise, although this is not included in its 
statute and opposition to this remains rather strong, mainly because of the 
inflationary risks perceived by some member states, particularly Germany. 
Nevertheless, it seems most likely that in serious crisis situations, the 
European Central Bank would provide member states with unlimited 
liquidity.  
The softening of the prohibitions on government defaults and bail-outs 
was a necessary but insufficient precondition for the management of the 
crisis. It was sufficient to prevent financial and economic disaster (bank 
crises and sovereign defaults) in the short-term, but it did not properly 
address the core issues related to the limited compliances of the EMU with 
respect to the criteria for an optimum currency area.  
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In addition, it involved undesired negative side-effects. First, the EMU 
has faced solvency problems rather than liquidity problems, while the 
rescue funds were designed to ease the liquidity problems of indebted 
member states. Second, the softening of the non-default assumption and 
the no bail-out clause had nothing to do with long-term issues, such as the 
core problems of the Economic and Monetary Union including the 
restoration of competitiveness in the peripheral member states, the reduction 
of external imbalances (huge current account surpluses in the core 
economies and equally large deficits in the periphery) and the stimulation 
of economic growth. The changes to the pillars of the EMU provided EU 
institutions, member states and economic actors with the time to 
implement structural reforms, undertake measures to transition towards a 
genuine optimum currency area (not discussed in this report) and promote 
economic growth. However, the increased flexibility created by the 
softening of the prohibitions on government defaults and bail-outs may 
mitigate the pressure weighing on national governments and EU institutions 
to introduce reforms. Given the specific features of the monetary union, 
including the impossibility of devaluation, crisis management is more 
difficult, and the requirements for implementing structural reforms and 
improving competitiveness are more difficult in the EMU than outside it. 
Concerning future prospects, the possibility of moving towards an 
optimum currency area is limited. Such a move would only be feasible 
with the exclusion of the southern European member states (Greece, 
Portugal, Spain and Italy) from the EMU, which is neither a realistic 
assumption nor feasible. In addition, transitioning the EMU towards an 
optimum currency area would not be sufficient to solve the underlying 
institutional and governance problems.  
The most desirable development in the EMU would be progress 
towards a genuine monetary union combined with some forms of a fiscal 
union based on the mutualisation of debts with more common 
responsibilities. A first step in this direction could be a banking union. This 
scenario would be most appropriate for overcoming the institutional 
weaknesses of the present Economic and Monetary Union. The probability 
of this development is rather low because of the diverging interests of the 
member states. Germany has opposed proposals aimed at a shift towards 
fiscal union because of fears of free riding and moral hazard. The 
probability of a painful scenario based on internal devaluation is also low. 
Considering the political constraints, the most probable scenario is that as 
a result of the softening of the no bail-out clause, government debts will be 
inflated with the help of the ECB’s indirect quantitative (hopefully with 
strict conditionality) easing in the long run (there is no imminent 
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inflationary danger in the EMU), particularly if no solutions are found to 
the structural weaknesses of the EMU. 
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